ABSTRACT Wireless sensor network (WSN) can be widely used in the field of health care since it has many advantages, such as low cost, high efficiency, low latency, and so on. In healthcare wireless sensor network (HWSN), the patients' health information needs to be transmitted to health professionals in real time through the Internet, so it is vital to ensure the integrity and privacy of medical information. Aggregate signature (AS) cannot only provide message integrity and authentication for multiple users but also drastically improve the efficiency of signature transmission and verification. Certificateless public key cryptography (CLPKC) is superior to traditional public key infrastructure and identity-based cryptography. We combine the advantages of CLPKC and AS and construct a certificateless aggregate signature (CLAS) scheme without using pairings. Our CLAS scheme realizes the protection of the privacy and integrity of healthcare information for multiple patients in HWSN for the first time. Under the assumption of elliptic curve discrete logarithm, the proposed CLAS scheme is existentially unforgettable against two types of adversaries. In addition, the scheme has better performance than other CLAS schemes as for the security, communication overhead, and computational costs. So it is more suitable for green HWSN.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor network (WSN), which has the advantages of low cost, high efficiency, low latency, non-invasive acquisition of various physiological parameters of patients and so on, can be widely used in the medical field. A sensor node is placed on the patient's body to detect human parameters, which can monitor the patient's heart rate, blood pressure, electrocardiogram, heart sound and other physiological parameters remotely in real time, and transmits the information to the monitoring center for timely processing and feedback. Using WSN to collect human physiological data is helpful for knowing human health condition and researching human diseases. In addition, WSN has its extensive The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Nan Zhao. application in drug management and development of new drugs, blood management and many other aspects. In all, WSN provides a more convenient and low-cost way for future telemedicine monitoring system.
In 2007, Yuce et al. [1] introduced the framework of healthcare wireless sensor network (HWSN), which consists of sensors, patients, central control unit (CCU), cloud based network, as well as healthcare professionals. Sensors are embedded in/on the patient's body. The patient health data detected by sensor nodes are sent to a CCU for further processing. The processed data are transmitted to healthcare professionals through the internet. Then, healthcare professionals generate patient's medical reports based on these data. Since medical data need to be transmitted via the internetčit is vital to guarantee the integrity and privacy of these data. If an adversary changes the medical data transmitted halfway, healthcare professionals may make a wrong diagnosis, which will be very dangerous for patients. In addition, leakage of patients' healthcare information may lead to privacy problems. Patients are often reluctant to disclose what ailments they suffer from. Hence, it is very important to assure the privacy and integrity of personal health data [2] - [4] . Digital signature technology can prevent an adversary from tampering with the transmitted data and it can provide authentication and message integrity protection for users. However, when a large number of patients' medical data are transmitted online, the bandwidth and storage cost will increase significantly, and the computational cost of quickly verifying these data is also very expensive, which makes the ordinary digital signature schemes unsuitable for HWSN. Therefore, we study certificateless aggregate signatures in HWSN.
A. RELATED WORKS
Boneh et al. [5] put forward the definition of aggregate signature in 2003. An aggregate signature is able to collect n (n > 1) signatures of n different messages signed by n different users into a single signature, and the receiver only verifies this aggregated signature instead of n signatures. An aggregate signature drastically reduces the computational cost of signature verification and the overhead of signature transmission. Consequently, there are many application scenarios for aggregate signature, such as HWSN. Aggregate signature can provide medical information integrity and authentication for multiple patients under the premise of greatly saving the transmission bandwidth and computing resources. Therefore, it is more suitable for resource-constrained HWSN.
In 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson [6] presented Certificateless Public Key Cryptography (CLPKC) which can deal with the problems of certificate management in conventional public key infrastructure and private key escrow in identity-based cryptography. Following the first certificateless signature scheme in [6] , many novel certificateless signature schemes have been presented, and we refer the readers to [7] - [12] .
In recent years, certificateless aggregate signature (CLAS) schemes have attracted much attention in order to satisfy the application requirements in certificateless environments. Gong et al. [13] put forward two CLAS schemes based on bilinear pairings for the first time. Zhang et al. [14] , [15] constructed two new CLAS schemes from bilinear pairings. Chen et al. [16] put forward a novel CLAS scheme. These schemes in [13] , [14] , [16] are inefficient since many expensive pairing computations are involved in the verification algorithm. Xiong et al. [17] presented an efficient CLAS scheme, and the bilinear pairings involved in their scheme are constant. However, He et al. [18] showed that Xiong et al. 's scheme is forgeable by a Type II adversary, and then He et al. gave an improvement for the scheme [17] , but Li et al. [19] showed that the improved scheme in [18] is still not secure against a malicious-but-passive KGC. Liu et al. [20] and Chen et al. [21] constructed an efficient CLAS scheme with constant pairing computations and constant signature length, respectively. Unfortunately, Zhang et al. [22] showed the schemes [20] , [21] cannot resist Type I and Type II adversaries. The authors in [23] , [24] presented a novel CLAS scheme for Vehicular Sensor Networks, respectively. Nevertheless, Kumar et al. [25] found the scheme [24] is vulnerable to attacks by a Type II adversary.
These CLAS schemes [13] - [21] , [23] , [24] are all constructed based on bilinear pairings. As we all know, the operation of bilinear pairing needs a heavy computational cost. In order to improve the computational efficiency of CLAS schemes, some researchers began to study CLAS schemes without bilinear pairings. Typically, Tian [26] proposed a CLAS scheme without bilinear pairings, but Tian did not provide the security proof for this scheme. Very recently, Cui et al. [27] put forward an efficient CLAS scheme without bilinear pairings in vehicular sensor networks. Qu and Mu [28] presented a novel CLAS scheme without bilinear pairings.
To ensure medical information authentication and integrity in HWSN, Kumar et al. [29] proposed a CLAS scheme for secure communication in HWSN. But Wu et al. [30] proved that the scheme [29] can be broken by a Type II adversary, and Wu et al. also presented a CLAS scheme for HWSN. Unfortunately, Wu et al.'s scheme is still insecure against a Type II adversary. Moreover, the two schemes are all constructed based on bilinear pairings. These CLAS schemes with many pairing calculations are not suitable for resourceconstrained HWSN.
B. CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, combining the advantages of CLPKC and aggregate signature, we study certificateless aggregate signatures for secure communication in HWSN, and construct a reliable CLAS scheme to solve the problems of medical message integrity, authentication, as well as privacy in HWSN. Compared with other CLAS schemes, our scheme has better performance as follows.
(1) Without employing expensive bilinear pairings and MapToPoint hash functions, we use elliptic curve cryptography to construct CLAS scheme, and the main operation of our scheme is scalar multiplication on elliptic curve. Therefore, ours has higher computational efficiency than the existing CLAS schemes with bilinear pairings. (2) We introduce the techniques of patient's pseudo identity and timestamp to ensure patient's identity privacy and the freshness of data transmission. We prove that our CLAS scheme can absolutely resist the attacks of two types of adversaries under the elliptic curve discrete logarithm assumption. (3) Our CLAS scheme satisfies the requirements of unforgeability and identity privacy preservation. For the first time, it realizes the protection of message integrity and privacy for multiple patients with the lower communication and computing costs in HWSN. 
II. PRELIMINARIES A. ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOSYSTEM
Suppose that symbol F r shows a prime finite field, where r is a prime. Notation E/F r indicates an elliptic curve E over F r , which is specified by the following equation:
, for α ∈ F r , β ∈ F r and (4α 3 + 27β 2 ) mod r = 0. Let the notation o indicate a point at infinity. o and the points over E/F r compose an additive group G of elliptic curve under the computation of point addition M = Q+R for Q, R ∈ G defined on the basis of a chord-and-tangent rule. Suppose P is a generator of the group G, and the order of G is q, we call the operation nP = P + P + . . . + P (n times, n ∈ Z q ) as a scalar multiplication on elliptic curve.
B. COMPUTATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS
Let's assume that G represents an additive group of elliptic curves, and the order of G is prime q. Let Q denote a generator of G. ECDL problem and CDH problem are defined as below.
-Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm (ECDL) problem For a random instance M ∈ G, where M = yQ and y ∈ Z q * , it is hard to compute y from M .
-Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem For a random instance λQ, ξ Q ∈ G, where λ, ξ ∈ Z * q are two unknown values, it is hard to work out λξ Q.
III. THE FRAMEWORK OF CLAS SCHEME FOR HWSN A. DEFINITION OF CLAS SCHEME FOR HWSN
We present the framework of our CLAS scheme for HWSN in Figure 1 .
There exist four entities in a CLAS scheme for HWSN: medical server (MS), sensor node, signature aggregator and healthcare professional. MS has powerful computing power and plenty of storage space, and can detect a great deal of data received from sensors. Moreover, MS is responsible for producing a system master key, a system parameter, a partial private key for every sensor node. Sensor nodes, which are small resource-limited medical devices implanted into patients' body to collect data, generate signatures on collected medical data from patients' body. Suppose there is one signature aggregator in every Care-District which is an area involving in medical treatment. We divide different Care-Districts according to different diseases and assume that one Care-District is used to monitor one disease. For example, to monitor heart pulse rate, all sensors used to detect heart pulse rates come from one Care-District. The signature aggregator collects the signatures from its respective Care-District to generate an aggregated signature and transmits the aggregated signature to MS. After handling these data, MS sends the patient's information to healthcare professionals. The healthcare professionals verify aggregated signatures received from MS, and then provide appropriate prescriptions for patients according to medical information sensed by sensor nodes. 
B. SECURITY MODEL FOR CLAS SCHEME IN HWSN
In a CLAS scheme for HWSN, we need to think over two kinds of adversaries with different abilities as below. Type I Adversary: A 1 : A 1 who simulates an external attacker can not obtain the system master key nor the partial private key of sensor node. But he/she can get a sensor node's secret value or substitute a sensor node's public key with a new value chosen by himself / herself.
Type II Adversary: A 2 : A 2 simulates an honest-but-curious MS who has the system master key and every sensor node's partial private key, but A 2 is unable to get the secret value of sensor node nor replace the public key of sensor node.
We propose a security model for CLAS scheme in HWSN. The model is actualized by the following two games, in which A 1 and A 2 interact with challenger X 1 and X 2 , respectively.
Game I:
• Setup: X 1 inputs a security parameter l, the algorithm returns a system master key smk and a system parameters Params. And then, smk is kept secretly by X 1 , and Params is sent to A 1 .
• Query: A 1 is able to adaptively ask the following oracles: Create-User: When this query is received on an identity ID i of a sensor node, X 1 performs Partial-Private-Key-Extract algorithm to produce the partial private key d IDi for the sensor node, and runs algorithm Sensor-Key-Generate to generate the secret value x i of the sensor node and its public key pk i . Then X 1 inserts (ID i , d IDi , x i , pk i ) into a list L list , and sends pk i to A 1 .
Partial-Private-Key-Extract: On receipt of this query on ID i , X 1 scans the list L list to find the item corresponding to
Secret-Value-Extract: A 1 can query this oracle with inputs an identity ID i and get the secret value x i .
Public-Key-Replacement: A 1 is able to substitute the sensor node ID i 's public key pk i with the new one pk * i . Sign: Given this query on a medical message m i , a timestamp t i , an identity ID i of sensor node and the current public key pk i , X 1 executes algorithm Sign and generates a signature σ i and sends it to A 1 .
Forgery: At last, A 1 returns a forged aggregate signature σ * on messages/timestamps m
under the identities ID * 1 , ID * 2 , · · · , ID * n and the current public keys pk * 1 , pk * 2 , . . . , pk * n and succeeds in the game if the following three conditions are achieved:
-σ * is a valid certificateless aggregate signature on m
. ., n has never been submitted to the oracle Partial-Private-KeyExtract.
-The tuple (ID * I , m * I , t * I ) has never been submitted to the Sign oracle.
Game II: This game involves challenger X 2 and adversary A 2 as described below.
• Setup: X 2 performs Setup algorithm just like that in Game I. Afterwards, X 2 sends the system master key smk to A 2 .
• Query: A 2 can adaptively query Create-User oracle, Secret-Value-Extract oracle and Sign oracle, just like those queries in Game I.
Note: A 2 can calculate partial private key of a sensor node because it has the system master key smk. Therefore, A 2 need not query the Partial-Private-Key-Extract oracle.
Forgery: Finally, A 2 returns a forged certificateless aggregate signature σ * on messages/timestamps 
IV. OUR CLAS SCHEME FOR HWSN A. THE BASIC SCHEME
We construct an efficient certificateless aggregate signature scheme for HWSN. Four entities are involved in our scheme: medical server (MS), sensor node (SN), signature aggregator (SA), as well as healthcare professional (HP). And the scheme is specified by seven algorithms as below:
On taking as input a security parameter k, MS picks two large prime numbers p, q and generates the tuple {F p , E/F p , G, P} as defined in Part A of Section II.
Then, MS randomly selects a value ξ ∈ Z * q as the system master key and calculates P pub = ξ P. MS keeps ξ in secret.
There are two secure hash functions as below. Parameters Params = {p, q, P, E, G, h 0 , h, P pub } are published.
Note: In the following construction of our scheme, since the hash function h has three types of input parameters. In order to distinguish the three types of the inputs, we use the notations h 1 , h 2 and h 3 .
-Partial-Private-Key-Extract: A sensor node SN i whose real identity is TID i ∈{0,1} l picks a random value δ i ∈ Z * q and produces ID i = (ID i1 , ID i2 ) as its pseudo identity, where 
Given a pseudo identity ID i of a sensor node SN i , MS picks a random number α i ∈ Z * q and computes
as the partial private key for SN i . MS sends the partial private key (R i , d IDi ) to SN i through a secure channel. Note: The real identity of the sensor node SN i is known only to MS and the users authorized by SN i , which protects the patient's identity privacy.
-Sensor-Key-Generation: Sensor node SN i randomly picks x i ∈ Z * q as its secret value and calculates ηk i = x i P, and sets pk i = (R i , ηk i ) as its public key.
-Sign: Given Params, a medical message m i , the sensor node SN i with the pseudo identity ID i and the public key pk i = (R i , ηk i ) selects the latest timestamp t i and performs as below.
(1) Choose a random number r i ∈ Z * q and calculate 
or not. If the equality holds,
Otherwise, σ i is declined.
Aggregate:
Upon receiving an aggregating set V of n sensor nodes {SN 1 , SN 2 , . . ., SN n } with the identities {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . ., ID n } and the public keys {pk 1 , pk 2 , . . ., pk n }, and n message / timestamp / signature tuples (m 1 , t 1 , v 2 ) ),..., (m n ,t n ,σ n = (S n , v n )), SA computes v = n i=1 v i , and outputs σ = (S 1 , S 2 , · · · , S n , v) as a certificateless aggregate signature.
Aggregate verify: Given a certificateless aggregate signature σ = {S 1 , S 2 , · · · , S n , v} signed by SN 1 , SN 2 , . . ., SN n with ID 1 , ID 2 , . . ., ID n and the corresponding public keys pk 1 , pk 2 , . . ., pk n on messages/ timestamps m 1 t 1 , m 2 t 2 , · · · , m n t n , if these timestamps t 1 , t 2 , · · · , t n are valid, the algorithm computes as the followings.
• Compute
• Check whether
holds or not. If the equality holds, σ = {S 1 , S 2 , · · · , S n , v} is accepted. Otherwise, it is rejected. q ppk queries to Partial-Private-Key-Extract oracle is able to breach our CLAS scheme for HWSN with a non-negligible probability ε, we can build an algorithm X 1 using A 1 as a subroutine to find the answer of ECDL problem with a probability ε ≥ n · ε((q 1 − 1)/q 1 ) q ppk /q 1 .
Proof: Given a tuple (P, aP∈ G) which is a random instance of ECDL problem, X 1 's ultimate target is to find the answer a after interacting with A 1 .
Setup: X 1 randomly chooses z ∈ Z q * and calculates P pub = zP, and then produces Params: {p,q,P,E, G, h 0 , h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , P • If ID i = ID I , X 1 chooses two random numbers
• If ID i = ID I , X 1 randomly selects f i ∈ Z * q , sets R i = aP,H 1 (ID i , R i ) = f i , and d IDi = ⊥.
In both cases, we say the identity ID i has been created. The sensor node ID i ' s partial private key is (R i , d IDi ), and its secret value is x i . X 1 sends pk i = (R i , ηk i ) to A 1 , and adds the tuple ( • If ID i = ID I and pk i corresponding to ID i has never been substituted, C 1 runs algorithm Sign to produce a signature σ i = (S i , v i ) and sends σ i to A 1 .
• If ID i = ID I and the public key pk i has been replaced, X 1 recovers the list L list and finds the corresponding item
, and picks three random numbers h i , l i , v i ∈ Z * q , and calculates
and sets h 2 (m i , ID i , t i , pk i , S i , P, P pub ) = h i and 
We can obtain the two equations as below.
From (2)- (1), X 1 can obtain 
So, X 1 can solve ECDL problem with a probability ε ≥ n · ε((q 1 − 1)/q 1 ) q ppk /q 1 .
Theorem 2: If a probabilistic polynomial time adversary A 2 who executes at most q 1 queries to H 1 hash oracle and q sv queries to Secret-Value-Extract oracle is able to breach our CLAS scheme for HWSN with a non-negligible probability ε, we are able to construct an algorithm X 2 to find the answer of ECDL problem with a probability ε ≥ n·ε((q 1 −1)/q 1 ) q sv /q 1 by using A 2 as a subroutine.
Proof: We will illustrate how X 2 makes use of A 2 to settle a random instance (P, aP∈ G) of ECDL problem. Setup X 2 randomly picks a value z from Zq * and calculates P pub = zP, and produces Params: 
Then, X 2 works as follows:
• If ID i = ID I , X 2 picks a random x i ∈ Z * q and calculates ηk i = x i P;
• If ID i = ID I , X 2 lets ηk i = aP and x i = ⊥. In both cases, we say that identity ID i has been created. X 2 returns ID i 's public key pk i = (R i , ηk i ) to A 2 , and inserts an item
Secret-Value-Extract: Given a query on a created identity ID i , X 2 finds the corresponding item ( Sign: A 2 submits this query on a medical message m i , an identity ID i and the public key pk i , as well as a timestamp t i , X 2 calculates as follows:
• If ID i = ID I , X 2 normally runs algorithm Sign to produce a signature σ i = (S i , v i ) and sends σ i to A 2 .
• If ID i = ID I , X 2 recovers the list L list and finds the corresponding item (
and H list 3 , respectively. Forgery: Finally, A 2 returns a forged certificateless aggregate sig-
. ., SN * n with these identities ID * 1 , ID * 2 , · · · , ID * n and the public keys pk * 1 , pk * 2 , . . ., pk * n . If ID I / ∈ {ID * 1 , ID * 2 , · · · , ID * n }, X 2 aborts. Otherwise, without loss of generality, we suppose
2 and H list 3 , respectively. Then, the forking lemma [31] is applied in the following simulation. X 2 replays A 2 with the same random tape, but it endows the hash function H 2 with a different value. That is,
From (4)- (3), X 2 can work out
Finally, X 2 gets the answer a to the challenging ECDL problem.
Using a method similar to that used to calculate probability in Theorem 1, we deduce that X 2 is able to settle ECDL VOLUME 7, 2019 problem with a probability ε ≥ n · ε((q 1 − 1)/q 1 ) q sv /q 1 . is SN i for i = 1, 2, . . ., n. So, the proposed scheme satisfies the integrity and authentication of message. In addition, the adversary cannot change or forge the patient's message or signature, which also ensures the patient does not deny a valid signed message generated by himself /herself, so as to avoid causing medical disputes.
2) MESSAGE INTEGRITY AND AUTHENTICATION

3) IDENTITY PRIVACY PRESERVATION
In our scheme, we introduce the technique of pseudo identity to protect a patient's privacy. The real identity of the patient is known only by MS and the users authorized by the patient. Even if an adversary intercepts the patient's all data transmitted over the Internet, he/she does not known the real identity of the patient corresponding to these data. The reasons are as follows.
In the proposed CLAS scheme, the patient's pseudo identity is ID i = (ID i1 , ID i2 ), for ID i1 = δ i P and ID i2 = TID i ⊕ h 0 (δ i · P pub ), and the patient's real identity is TID i . Without knowing the random value δ i or the system master key ξ , it is hard for an adversary to work out δ i · P pub or ξ · ID i1 unless he/she solves the CDH problem. As a result, the adversary cannot get the real identity TID i from the pseudo identity ID i . Therefore, our CLAS scheme is able to protect the privacy of patients.
When a doctor-patient dispute occurs, MS can provide the real identity of the patient if it needs to be disclosed. Given the pseudo identity ID i = (ID i1 , ID i2 ), MS is able to calculate TID i = ID i2 ⊕ h 0 (ξ · ID i1 ) to get TID i and submits it to the arbitration agency.
C. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We use the same execution time for the related operations in the calculation cost comparison, which is computed by using MIRACL library [32] . The program is performed over a virtual machine whose configuration is 1.9GB RAM, Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 CPU M 560 @ 2.67GHz × 4. The operating system is Ubuntu 16.04 LTS for 64 bits. The running times required for cryptographic operations are displayed in Table 1 from literature [27] . The execution time of addition or multiplication in Z q * and general hash function is trivial. For example, the time required to perform a general hash operation is only 0.0001 ms. So, we neglect these trivial operations in performance evaluation.
If we consider the schemes based on bilinear pairings, the Tate pairing over supersingular elliptic curve E/F q : y 2 = x 3 + x, which q denotes a 512-bit prime, can attain the security level of 1024-bit RSA algorithm. Next, we consider the schemes based on elliptic curves. In order to get the same security level, we use elliptic curve group over Koblitz elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 +αx +β on a finite Field F 2 163 which α =1 and β is a 163-bit random prime.
Suppose that symbols |G pr | and |G ecc | indicate the size of a group element based on bilinear pairing and a group element based on elliptic curve, respectively, |Z q * | denotes the size of a group Z q * which q denotes a 163 -bit prime.
We compare our scheme with other proposed CLAS schemes as for security, computational cost as well as communication overhead in Tables 2 and 3 . Suppose that 100 signatures generated by 100 sensor nodes need to be aggregated in the aggregate algorithm, that is, n = 100.
From Table 2 and Table 3 , we can see that our CLAS scheme possesses the best performance than other schemes [14] , [17] , [24] , [19] , [29] , [30] , [27] , [28] . In terms of computational cost, ours totally needs 1T sm +(3n+1)T sm + (4n − 1)T pa = 302T sm + 399T pa in Sign and AggregateVerify algorithms, and the operating time is 302 × 0.4420 + 399 × 0.0018 = 134.2022ms, which is 10.05% of that of the CLAS scheme in literature [14] , 16 .7% of that of the CLAS scheme in [17] , 21 .3% of that of the CLAS scheme in [24] , 16 .5% of that of the CLAS scheme in [19] , 20.9% of that of the CLAS scheme in [29] , 16 .5% of that of the CLAS scheme in [30] . The computational efficiency of our scheme is slightly lower than that of the schemes [27] , [28] , but our scheme is secure against Type I and Type II adversaries. We point out the scheme [27] cannot resist the attack of a Type II adversary, and the scheme [28] is forgeable under the attack of public key replacement of a Type I adversary (See APPENDIX A).
As shown in Tables 2 and 3 , the aggregate signature produced by our scheme consists of one group element in Z q * and 100 group elements based on elliptic curves, the size of aggregate signature generated by our scheme is (101×163)/8=2058 bytes. The size of aggregate signature in [27] , [28] is also 2058bytes. The size of aggregate signature in [14] , [17] , [24] , [19] , [29] , [30] is 101|G pr | = (101 × 512)/8 = 6464 bytes. So, our CLAS scheme achieves high efficiency in terms of communication overhead.
In Figure 2 , we compare the time spent on verifying aggregate signatures between our scheme and several other CLAS schemes [14] , [17] , [24] , [19] , [29] , [30] , [27] , [28] .
In the CLAS schemes [14] , [17] , [24] , [19] , [29] , [30] , [27] , [28] , only the schemes [29] , [30] are based on healthcare wireless sensor network. However, the authors [30] have proved that the CLAS scheme [29] is not secure against a Type II adversary, and then they presented an improvement for scheme [29] . Unfortunately, the improved scheme is still insecure against a Type II adversary. Moreover, the two schemes [29] , [30] cannot preserve the patients' identity privacy.
Hence, our scheme has better performance than those in [14] , [17] , [24] , [19] , [29] , [30] , [27] , [28] , and it not only provides message integrity, authentication and privacy for multiple users in HWSNs, but also has lower computational cost and communication overhead.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In healthcare wireless sensor network, patients' medical data are transmitted to health professionals in real time and online. However, these medical data can be easily compromised by some attacks. The privacy and integrity of medical data have attracted great attention in healthcare industry. In this paper, we take advantage of CLPKC and aggregate signature to present the first CLAS scheme without bilinear pairings for secure communication in HWSN. Our CLAS scheme can preserve the integrity and privacy of medical data transmitted online. It provides real-time and secure communication between patients and healthcare professionals at lower computing and communication costs. Therefore, the proposed scheme is very suitable for application in green HWSN. In addition, our scheme can also be used in the Internet of Things, vehicular ad hoc networks and wireless sensor networks, etc. with appropriate modification. Our future work is to construct a more efficient CLAS scheme for resourceconstrained wireless networks. APPENDIX A. APPENDIX A 1) ATTACK ON SCHEME [27] In [27] , Cui et al. proposed a novel CLAS scheme on the basis of elliptic curve cryptosystem. We point out that Cui et al.'s CLAS scheme is insecure against a Type II adversary. The concrete attack is described as below.
Let's review the Sign algorithm in the scheme [27] as below.
Sign Given a traffic-related message m i , the vehicle V i picks a random value r i ∈ Z * q and calculates R i = r i P and sets h i = h 3 
